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Locke
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14.09.2020 08:23:43
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11-19 век;
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Это и есть базовый тезис Хантингтона в Soldier And The State относительно
>Где то читал, что Прусский Генштаб, стал результатом анализа операций Наполеона. Что такому гению, который мог держать в голове всю обстановку могло противостоять только коллективный мозг. Где это можно прочитать подробно?
>ignorare legis est lata culpa
года рождения - 1806 - военного офицерства как профессии. Вот цитата:
STAFFS. The primacy of Prussia was most obvious in the development of a professional staff. The Prussian general staff properly dates from November 25, 1803 when the king ordered the reorganization of the previously existing Quartermaster General's supply staff into a true general staff. Earlier, in 1800, General von Lecoq had carried through some preliminary reforms, but the basic outline of a general staff in modern, professional terms is first found in the memoranda drafted by Colonel von Massenbach in 1802-1803 which served as the basis for the royal directive of the latter year. Under this order officers were appointed to the staff only after passing a special examination, and they were subsequently rotated between staff positions and regimental duties. The duties of the General Staff were divided into two categories: permanent duties involving the development of the fundamental principles of military operations, and special duties involving current military problems and the preparation of war plans.
The General Staff never had the opportunity to function effectively prior to the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon. In 1808, however, Schamhorst reorganized the staff, redefined more precisely its duties, inaugurated the division between the Great General Staff in Berhn and the Field Forces General Staff, linked the achievement of staff positions to the Kriegsakademie, and instituted the beginnings of the system of dual command whereby general staff officers shared in the responsibility of commanders. After the downfall of Napoleon the General Staff continued to exercise in peacetime the functions which it had previously exercised in war. Throughout the nineteenth century the General Staff tended to be the organizational stronghold of Prussian professionalism. In the
early decades it had to struggle for position and recognition against both the War Ministry and the Military Cabinet which tended to be the center of aristocratic reaction. Under the leadership of von Moltke, however, who became its chief in 1857, the General Staff rapidly acquired preeminence. The scientific and rational expertise of Moltke became the dominant ideal of the German officer corps. From the 1860's on, service in the General Staff was the most coveted duty in the German Army. The wine-red trouser stripe of the General Staff officers became the symbol of a new elite within the officer corps, the cream of the profession, signifying the highest standards of knowledge, competence, and devotion to duty. For the General Staff officer, far more than for any other member of the officer corps, all else was subordinated to the requirements of professional service. "Always be more than you seem," was Moltke's injunction to his staff officers. Half a century later von Seeckt summed up the tradition in crisp phrases:
The form changes, but the spirit remains as of old. It is the spirit of silent, selfless devotion to duty in the service of the Army. General Staff officers remain anonymous.
Probalbly the most revolutionary aspect of the Prussian system was its assumption that genius was superfluous, and even dangerous, and that reliance must be placed upon average men succeeding by superior education, organization, and experience. This approach, on the one hand, subordinated the individual to the collective will and intelligence of the whole, and yet guaranteed to the individual wide freedom of action so long as he remained upon his proper level and within his sphere of responsibility. It was the antithesis of the eighteenth-century theory of the military genius. English observers of the Prussian system were impressed by the absence of the slavish and mechanical obedience to superiors characteristic of other armies and the extent to which each officer performed his particular function without intervening in the duties of others.
In France, in 1800 General Paul Thiebault published the first staff manual of the modern period. In actual practice Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff, developed a rudimentary general staff organization, although its entire structure and functioning were
colored by Napoleon's ability and genius and by Berthier's small-ness and jealousy. During the Restoration, St. Cyr established both a staff corps and a school to train officers for it, but not a general staff itself. Members of this corps were employed with troop commands, at the War Ministry and other administrative headquarters, as military attaches in foreign countries, and as instructors in the higher military schools. There was, however, no such thing as a "Great General Staff" with an autonomous existence in the War Ministry, nor was there a chief of staff. Consequently, the education and work of staff officers lacked purpose and focus. After 1831 the staff corps increasingly became a narrowly technical service concerned with drawing and topography. French staff development was also handicapped by the continuation of the eighteenth-century concept, reinforced by the Napoleonic and African wars, that the superior officer was one who relied upon his inherent natural gifts rather than expert advice and assistance. In general, the level of competence of the staff corps and its ability to grapple successfully with the problems which should have concerned a professional staff declined steadily during the forty years from 1830 to 1870. By the Franco-Prussian War the French staff had reached such a low point that it was hardly surprising that it proved no equal of its German counterpart.
During his continental wars Wellington developed an efficient staff for the British Army. With the conclusion of peace, however, the British staff more or less disintegrated, and throughout the nineteenth century Great Britain did not have a general staff in the modern sense of the word. The inept performance of the army in the Crimean War resulted in some steps toward the reconstruction of a staff, but the only lasting result was the creation of the Staff College in 1857. The only staff in the British Army was in the adjutant general and quartermaster departments: there was no real staff concerned with military operations and military intelligence — the domain of strategy and tactics as contrasted with administration and supply. This deficiency was not overcome until the first decade of the twentieth century when the work of enthusiasts such as Spenser Wilkinson combined with the lessons of the Boer War to produce a reorganization of the army. In 1904 an Army Council was created and the position of Chief of the General Staff came into existence. A few years later this was extended to provide for military cooperation with the dominions through the Imperial General Staff.
Другой вопрос - это спорный тезис, т.к. Наполеон сам по себе уже пользовался основным функционалом того, что считается "генеральным штабом".
Вообще я всячески рекомендую прочитать эту книгу, хотя ее очевидно никогда не переведут на русский...